- Congestion v Content provision in Net Neutrality: The case of Amazon’s Twitch.tv.
In the media: bloomberg.com.
Abstract: Net neutrality encourages content provision but also increases traffic and congestion. I study neutrality in Amazon’s Twitch.tv, which prioritizes popular content providers by assigning them a fast lane. I estimate congestion, demand, and supply models. Using a supply-increasing technological shock, I identify congestion costs for content providers and their consumers. Using shocks in prioritization, I identify its benefits. With estimated preferences and technological parameters, I construct net-neutrality counterfactuals; consumer welfare drops 5%. After introducing a counterfactual monopolistic platform that extracts prioritization rents, net neutrality increases content provision, but consumer welfare still drops due to lower content quality and congestion externalities.
- Can Price Dispersion be supported solely by Information Frictions?
Abstract: Yes, but one needs to assume that consumers know the realized price distribution, and that they do not know which firm has what price. Even with identical consumers and identical firms, if firms set prices in a first stage, and if consumers search sequentially in a second stage, then price dispersion arises in the form of a mixed strategy subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium. In contrast to Burdett and Judd (1983), price quotes are not required to be “noisy.” Moreover, actual search is predicted to be nontrivial.
- A Memo on the Proof-of-Stake Mechanism with George Gui and Ali Hortaçsu
Abstract: We analyze the economic incentives generated by the proof-of-stake mechanism discussed in the Ethereum Casper upgrade proposal. Compared with proof-of-work, proof-of-stake has a different cost structure for attackers. In Budish (2018), three equations characterize the limits of Bitcoin, which has a proof-of-work mechanism. We investigate their counterparts and evaluate the risk of double-spending attack and sabotage attack. We argue that PoS is safer than PoW agaisnt double-spending attack because of the tractability of attackers, which implies a large “stock” cost for the attacker. Compared to a PoW system whose mining equipments are repurposable, PoS is also safer against a sabotage attack.
- Perception, Utility and Evolution, forthcoming in Economic Theory Bulletin.
Abstract: This paper presents a model of the evolution of the hedonic utility function in which perception is imperfect. Netzer (2009) considers a model with perfect perception and finds that the optimal utility function allocates marginal utility where decisions are made frequently. This paper shows that it is also beneficial to allocate marginal utility away from more perceptible events. The introduction of perceptual errors can lead to qualitatively different utility functions, such as discontinuous functions with flat regions rather than continuous and strictly increasing functions.
- Pay-what-you-want because I do not know how much to charge you, in Economics Letters, Volume 137, 41-44, 2015.
Abstract: With any positive fraction of altruistic consumers in the population who give away any positive fraction of their gains from trade, there exists a high enough level of uncertainty about demand such that the monopolist prefers pay-what-you-want over the traditional monopoly or any other pricing mechanism. Low marginal costs facilitate the adoption of pay-what-you-want. Consumer welfare always increases with pay-what-you-want.
- The profitability and performance of U.S. regional banks using the predictive focus of the “fundamental analysis research”, with Glenn Growe, Marinus DeBruine and John Y. Lee in Advances in Management Accounting, Volume 24, 191-239, 2014.
More coming soon!